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Justice anzd the Poor in England. By F. C. G. Gurney-Champion. London,
George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1926. pp. x, 245.
The foreword, signed by the Lord Bishop of Manchester and other
eminent religious leaders, justly says, "This book is a complete study of
the administration of justice in England and Wales, as it affects the poor".
As such it is an invaluable addition to the gradually accumulating literature
of comparative legal aid work. More important is the fact that from the
pages of this volume we can learn why the English system of legal aid
has been a failure.
The author writes with the penetrating insight of an English solicitor
who has watched the administration of justice as it actually deals with
poor persons' cases. He has spent some years in assembling the basic
facts, has closely followed the work of the Parliamentary Committees that
have endeavored to arrest a breakdown; and his analysis of the causes of
the existing denial of justice to the poor in England is clear, logical, and
relentless.
Mr. Gurney-Champion paints a vivid picture which is profoundly in-
structive to all of us who are interested in improving the position of the
poor before the law in America. I shall try to make this review yield for
us the fruit of the book's keen observations by interpreting the strength and
weakness of the English system in terms of contrast to our own legal aid
institutions in the United States.
'Five co~rdinate elements are essential to secure legal justice to poor
persons. First, the substantive law must be impartial, and the English
law is impartial. Second, the administration of justice must be efficient,
the courts must be well organized and the rules of procedure must be
business-like; and in these respects the English administration of jutice
commands our admiration. Third, those indispensible ministers of justice,
whether called lawyers, attorneys, barristers or solicitors, must be well-
trained, must be organized for collective action and self-discipline, and must
have a high ethical sense of professional responsibility to the public in
general and to the poor in particular; and for their great uchievement-
along these lines our English brethren merit the tribute of our sincere
praise. Fourth, inasmuch as the state properly assesses a part of the ex-
pense of the courts on the litigants through a system of costs and fees,
some special provision for impoverished suitors must be made through
an adequate in fornaa pauperis system. The English Poor Persons Rule:
of the Supreme Court, although they have not been extended to the County
Courts and are weakened by certain technical anomalies, are per se in-
herently sound if the special and limited purpose for which such rules exist
is clearly understood. Certainly these provisions are far better than any
comparable poor litigants' statutes in our states, as Professor "Jaguire
has demonstrated in "Poverty and Civil Litigation".'
Fifth, there must be definite and responsible agencies through which the
services of attorneys can be made available to all poor persons who are
unable to secure such services by paying for them in the ordinary way.
It is in this last field that the English have consistently failed. Here, for
some reason that is hard to understand, they have persistently followed,
albeit unconsciously, the incomplete legal aid system of such continental
1 (1923) 36 HARv. L. REv. 361.
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countries as France and Italy, have ignored the better plan that lies patent
before them in Edinburgh, and have failed to take any advantage of Amer
ica's ripe experience in developing our legal aid organizations which, with
those of Norway and Sweden, set the standard for the world.
In legal aid work, the adage "because of a nail the shoe was lost, because
of a shoe the horse was lost" and so on, is applicable. It is a chain in which
every link must be sound. The five elements noted above will stand up
under great pressure if united and integrated together; divided they fail.
Mr. Gurney-Champion perceives the trouble perfectly clearly. The reason
that "well over ten per cent of the population are denied justice solely on
account of their poverty" 2 which "is the greatest blot upon our modern
civilization" 3 is because "those in authority in England are again making
the old historical, traditional mistake of not considering and solving the
problem as a whole".
4
In recent years it has been urged that the legal aid organizations in our
American cities are indispensible adjuncts to the administration of justice.
The validity of this claim is proved with unusual clearness and force by
what has happened in England; indeed, from the point of view of the poor,
it would be reasonable to assert that the legal aid offices are more im-
portant than the courts themselves. No one can 'appreciate in full the
enormous service of our legal aid offices until he is confronted with a
realization of what happens in their absence. Without them the problem
is insoluble; and every effort to construct 'a plan that does not include them
comes to grief because the practical result is to put the cart before the
horse and to let the tail wag the dog. Before reading this book I should
have deemed the foregoing statements to be extreme and unwarranted;
but a summary of the situation in England will enable the reader to judge
for himself.
The declaration in Magna Carta "Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus aut
differemus, rectum aut justiciam", as re-enacted in subsequent statutes, is
still the law of the land.5 In trying to perform this obligation of the state
the English have alvays thought in terms of litigation. They started with
an in forma pauperis procedure during the reign of Henry VII O designed to
enable poor people to get into the courts, and ever since they have merely
elaborated and attempted extensions of this central idea of enabling the
poor to assert their rights in court. The Constitution of the United States
guaranties "the equal protection of the laws"; but very fortunately, and
perhaps only by chance, the originators of the American legal aid system
thought in terms of cases which needed the attention of lawyers in laut
offices.
In England there are "poor man's lawyers meetings" conducted by
religious, philanthropic, and political bodies, and by a few of the provincial
law societies.7 Of these the best is the Mansfield House University Settle-
ment which is as old as any American legal aid society. But while the
American legal aid offices were steadily becoming real law offices, staffed
by full-time attorneys with competent clerical assistants and with at least
rudimentary library facilities, open to clients throughout the normal work-
ing day, the English poor man's lawyers meetings remained disorganized,
staffed by solicitors hand young barristers who volunteer to work in the






7 Chapter III gives a full description of their organization and work.
BOOK REVIEWS
facilities, and in temporary offices unsuited for the dignified or efficient
conduct of a law practice. All honor is due to these tired men who give
of their time and strength, write out letters in their own hand, often
advance costs out of their own pockets, and receive no reward whatsoever,
not even the approbation of their fellows. "On the contrary, if a Poor
Man's Lawyer were known as such he would lose caste or professional
standing".8 The difficulties are so great that this irregular systeni "only
touches the fringe of the problem".0
The statistics of the American legal aid offices show that 90% of the
cases of the poor need never engage the attention of the courts; 25, re-
quire accurate advice and nothing more; 65 are disposed of by negotia-
tion or settlement or conciliation, or (re discontinued because after in-
vestigation the claim appears legally unsound. Hence it is fair to say
that of the legal justice needed by the poor a properly constituted legal
aid office can itself perform ninety per cent, invoking the further aid of the
courts in only ten per cent of the cases. In England, as the poor roan's
lawyers meetings have been entirely inadequate, the whole burden is
thrown on the courts with results that are deplorable from every point
of view.
Mr. Gurney-Champion says, "Legal advice is by far the most important
requisite, . . it is the key to the solution of the problem. The State
and local authorities make no provisions for giving legal advice to the
poor'"10 Theoretically, a poor man can ask a magistrate for his advice in
open court but "practically the giving of legal advice in the police courts
can be ignored as having no appreciable bearing on the problem".% Un-
less a poor man can get advice at a settlement there is no way for him to
determine his legal rights except by applying for leave under the rules to
start the complicated machinery of litigation.
The methods used by American legal aid attorneys in conducting cases
that require more than advice are precisely those employed by all other
attorneys in their own offices. Correspondence is had with the opposing
party or his attorney. There are interviews and conferences. In most
matters a settlement is reached after negotiation, or the differences are
adjusted by conciliation, or some mutually satisfactory solution is vorked
out in whatever way best suits the circumstances of the particular ease.
Such work constitutes the bulk of all law practice and of American legal
aid practice.
In England there is no provision for what Mr. Gurney-Champion calls
"conciliation", which term he uses to include all that we mean by corre-
spondence, negotiation, and adjustment, in fact, everything short of actual
litigation. The Poor Mlan's Lawyers Meetings are impotent in this respect
because they have no office facilities; even correspondence is difficult be-
cause there are no typists. One such meeting, conducted by a provincial
law society, has a rule "the assistance given will, under ordinary circum-
stances be limited to advice and in propcr cases to the writing of one
letter".12 Such a rule would kill legal aid work in America. In England,
the result is that a poor person with a valid claim must litigate it, and the
litigation must proceed to its bitter end. The administration of the Poor
Persons Rules is in the hands of the Poor Persons Department; but this is








(i.e. negotiation),13 To the poor person there is assigned a solicitor to
conduct his case. Even at this stage negotiations might dispose of many
matters but "under the Poor Persons Rules no poor person, nor any
solicitor for him, may discontinue, settle, or compromise proceedings with-
out the sanction of a court or judge." 14
The result of such a system can best be conveyed by figures. Our legal
aid offices in the United States receive 125,000 cases each year. They
handle about 115,000 of these themselves through their advice and negotia-
tion and carry only 10,000 to the courts. If the English system were in
force here all of the 125,000 cases would go into the courts or receive no
justice at all. No wonder the burden thrown on the English courts has
disturbed the government and the bar and has caused the machinery to
groan under its weight. "Properly applied, conciliation (i.e. negotiation)
would enormously reduce the number of poor persons' cases and the ex-
penses connected with giving legal aid to the poor. On the contrary, every
hindrance that could possibly be invented to prevent conciliation seems to
have been in favour with those in authority." 15
From this English attitude of thinking exclusively in terms of court
litigation and of making provision only for litigation there result a score
of other difficulties which need not exist at all and which are of no moment
whatsoever under our American legal aid practice. Within the limits of
this review only the two major troubles can be referred to.
In the English system the most essential person is the conducting
solicitor. The plan has broken down because, in spite of repeated appeals,
enough solicitors cannot be secured. "In 1925, there are over 400 cases of
poor persons who have been admitted to take proceedings under the rules,
and whose cases have been favorably reported on by the reporting solicitors,
but which it is impossible to bring before the courts, because there are no
conducting solicitors willing to take these cases up." 10
Nor can we blame the English solicitors because the state has really
attempted to unload on them the expense of administering justice to the
poor. Mr. Gurney-Champion refers again and again to the problem of
the solicitors' "out-of-pocket expenses including reasonable office-running
expenses" without which "no voluntary system, whether it is controlled by
a department or by a law society, has the least chance of permanent suc-
cess." 27 What is a fair allowance to solicitors without involving an
element of profit has agitated Parliamentary and Law Society committees.
In America this problem does not exist. The legal aid attorney is paid a
salary by an organization (whether public or private) that also supplies
the offices, pays the rent, and furnishes clerical assistance, postage,
stationery, and whatever else is needed in the conduct of the work.
A second English problem is the poverty test. What is the sum of
capital and/or income below which a man is legally a poor man and
entitled to legal aid? Mr. Gurney-Champion recurs to this problem re-
peatedly for the sake of emphasis.18 Of course, the only real test is a
flexible one that takes into account all the circumstances. Furthermore, the
ascertainment of whether the facts show the applicant to be a poor person
within the law (a function of the reporting solicitor) is a special and time-
consuming task in itself. The American legal aid organizations have never
fixed a rigid rule defining who is a legal aid client and, after mature
13 p. 39.
'14 pp. 85, 211.
1 5 p. 85.
1 0 p. 39; see also p. 193.
17 p. 43.
2 'pp. 82 and 44.
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deliberations in their annual conventions, have concluded that no rigid
rule is possible or expedient.
Their investigation to determine the fact of poverty tahes almost no time.
Ninety-nine per cent of their applicants are poor beyond peradventure.
As the case proceeds they learn all that is needed about the client, and
should they ever be mistaken, the opposing party is only too giad to -ound a
warning. During the five years that I was counsel for the Boston Legal
Aid Society some 15,000 cases were received by the organization; there
was hardly a case that caused any difficulty; and I have no recollection
of any instances in which prosperous persons deliberately endeavored to
impose on us. To define and prove poverty according to fied rules is
hard and results in hardship. In practice the whole problem evaporates
before the common sense of a properly-qualified legal aid attorney.
Mr. Gurney-Champion deals adequately and systematically with the
position of the poor before the criminal law;- but, as he correctly points
out, legal aid in criminal cases is in no substantial particular different from
legal aid in civil cases-both are essential in any thorough-going plan-So
that we need not stop for any special discussion concerning the poor man
accused of crime.
The English government is fully aware of the failure of its system;
and in 1925 on the report of Mr. Justice Lawrence's Committee, vhich has
been adopted by the Council of the Law Society- J) it was decided to entrust
the administration of poor persons' procedure to the Law Society in London.
As Mr. Gurney-Champion points out this will inure honesty and dfieiacy
in the highest degree; but as the root causes for the failure have not been
touched, the Law Society is left in the position of trying to maze bricl:3
without straw.
We shall now see in England the plan of caring for the legal needs of
the poor through the services of volunteer solicitors tried out under aus-
pices as favorable as can be had. But unless radical changes are made,
it is hard to see how the poor in England can be given as fine a type of
service as is made possible by the American legal aid organizations where
responsibility is definitely centralized, where a special technique for the
efficient conduct of the work is continuously maintained and developed,
and where competent attorneys devote all their time and their full strength
in behalf of their deserving clients.
Out of the Law Society's experience there may emerge a plan for genuine
legal aid offices. For a solution to the problem Mr. Gurney-Champion
emphasizes the desirability of establishing such "bureaux7' -" under the
control of the Law Society and the provincial law societies. Why England
should hesitate to take this step is hard to understand. The admirable
system of English courts and procedure plus the American system of
organized legal aid work should be able to furnish a complete solution for
the entire problem.
Until England does proceed along such lines it seems inevitable that the
poor will continue to suffer legal injustice. Of this the gentlemen repre-
senting the several religious denominations in England say in their fore-
word "As Christians, we consider this position to be inexpressibly injurious,
and inhuman; and being, moreover, contrary to the teaching of the Lord
Jesus Christ." Mr. Gurney-Champion proposes that the government
either redress the present situation or that it repeal Magna Carta by
enacting a draft bill2 - which recites that the state finds it impossible for
29 Chapters V and IX.20 p. 70.
21 pp. 146, 150.
2 2 AppendhK I, p. 165.
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financial reasons honorably to fulfill its obligation to the poor and which
concludes "This Act may be cited as the Poor Persons (Honesty) Bill, 1925."
It is to be hoped, indeed there is every reason to believe, that Justice and
the Poor in England will point the way and, by its revelation of the under-
lying causes, enable the English barristers and solicitors to erect a legal
aid system worthy of the highest traditions of the English common law.
And for their encouragement let us frankly admit that it is only within
very recent years and after the causes had been made plain that the
American bar bestirred itself to respond to Elihu Root's challenge in his
foreword to Justice and the Poor in the United States---"It is time to set
our own house in order."
REGINALD HEBER SMITH
Boston, Mass.
Cases on Equitable Relief Against Torts. By Zechariah Chafee, Jr. Cam-
bridge. Published by the Editor. 1924. pp. 522.
This collection of materials is edited "primarily for students who have
already mastered the main principles of Equity Jurisdiction and the
Specific Performance of Contracts." "It is entirely practicable, however,"
in the editor's opinion, "to use this book for the introductory study of
Equity if the more difficult cases be omitted."
The book is divided into six chapters and embraces some 500 pages. It
is designed for a course of some thirty lectures; but more material is inten-
tionally included than can be covered in such period. The volume will
properly mesh with the Harvard Law School curriculum. It is in sub-
stitution for Ames' cases on equitable relief against torts and comple-
mentary with Pound's Cases on Equitable Relief against Defamation and
Injuries to Personality. In structural arrangement and technique of
presentation of materials there is a nominal departure from Ames. In
types of cases presenting varied and more complex social, economic and
even political considerations, there is a substantial addition to and modern-
ization of Ames' materials. In the new volume also, there are almost no
cases reported from the none-too-intelligible literature of legal antiquity.
The presence of a decidedly liberal allowance of modern American materials
is also notable.
The first chapter-some 150 pages-is devoted to "The Growth and
Nature of the Jurisdiction over Particular Torts." Here is Chafee truly
Ames. The purpose of the chapter is to point out, concerning the various
torts, "that Chancery did not assume jurisdiction over them all simultan-
eously, and that each tort in the course of its development in Equity ex-
hibited certain specific peculiarities of treatment." To this end reported
cases and opinion-excerpts pass in review from earlier centuries down
approximately to date. There are "Waste", "Trespass", "Disturbance of
Easements", "Nuisance" and "Injuries to Business" to be so followed from
their legal antiquity to modern days. The "jump" from case to case may
be in terms of years or hundreds of years. Again, the "jump" may be
from the case of a nobleman pursuing his tenant who may be about to
prejudice his (the nobleman's) shade and shrubbery (1786), to a case con-
cerning the privileges of the lessee of commercial premises to make the
premises commercially fit (1878).
Assuming that it is important in a given case whether the rule of law
is one way rather than another, and assuming that the utility of rules of
law is determined by an evaluation of the social, economic and political
conditions of the times and place where, truly this chapter of cases rolls
up a voluminous hodgepodge of intricate problems concerning the Mo e's of
centuries long ago. If the author intends any such problem it seems almost
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too great to attempt. The author affords no references to sources of
materials which would be of assistance. But, grant a Utopian operation
of the particular rule on a yesterday at the place where, what of it? A
truism it is that "times change". Of course, it is also assumed by the
reviewer that it is scarcely useful to become religious over these "ancient
heads of equity" or their genealogy.
This is not necessarily intended as a *criticism of the author's accomplish-
ments in Chapter One. To the reviewer the material provides an excellent
teaching tool of legal methodology. It challenges the instructor's methods
of "solving" legal problems as well as affording opportunity to acquaint
the student with the problem of methods and results. To lead the student
to his own discovery that there is yet uncertainty and incompleteness in
the data concerning the "origins" of legal phenomena-let us say Waste or
Trespass, for example-lends aid to striking down any "budding" dogma-
tism or tendency to super-generalization and to inspire resort to scientific
method and possibly, even, further scientific research into the particular
problem at hand. An excursion into historical "origins" of legal institu-
tions may well be useful to develop scientific methods in beginning lawyers.
Again, as regards the "development" of let us say "Equitable Waste,"
Professor Chafee's materials may well be used to stimulate scientific
methodology in law study. To find varying assignments of reasons for
"Equitable Waste" in judges' opinions of the past 200 years may well be
used to provoke inquiry into the stimuli for such behavior and the validity of
the "theory." This will call for a choice of sources of data for such inquiry
and for the end in view. And again, of what significance are these general
statements (sometimes called "principles"), uttered by a judge in a ease
of a yesterday? To load rules of law with a social service for the era at
hand is sufficiently instructive on whence the pertinent data. A course
bringing out that legal evolution is not in vracuo, nor along metaphysical
"immutable principles" is invaluable. Instruction in a scientific method
that reaches out beyond the generalizations of judges into the present day
world of affairs, is likewise invaluable. A "solution" of cases "on principle"
yields to their pragmatic adjustment "on data." With these considerations
in mind the reviewer sees excellence in the romp through the historical
"origins" and "development" of the legal institutions treated.
Of the last section of the chapter-"Injuries to Business"--the reviewer
has doubts, however. These cases impress the reviewer as being primarily
problems in the substantive law of Trade Regulation. There seems to be
little question of "equitable" relief. The author's materials and the
arrangement thereof offer limited opportunity for any functional consider-
ation of Trade Regulation problems.
In presenting what the reviewer presumes to call the second section of
the author's book there is a departure, in form at least, from Ames. What
e xperience induced the change is not stated. Ames is substituted for "by a
different classification, in which each fundamental equitable problem, such
as . . . 'the balance of convenience' . . . [is] presented as a unit,
regardless of the kind of tort involved in the particular case which illus-
trates the problem." The cases are grouped by "general equitable
principles."
"Bases of Equitable Relief" is made the heading of Chapter II with sub-
divisions concerning "The Establishment of the Tort" and "The Inadequacy
of Other Remedies." Herein do we observe the courts, in the particular
case, putting cbntent into prevailing generalizations ("general principles")
-such generalizations as have heretofore been variously stated-see Hart
v. Leonard, page 150-and such more familiar formula as "inadequacy of
legal remedy" and "irreparable injury." How far the author's "establish-
ment" of "the tort" is intended to be in illustration of or a departure from
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Langdell's teachings concerning the impotence of equity is not quite clear
to the reviewer.
Material affording opportunity to examine various types of injunctional
orders, the problem of ordering "affirmative acts" as distinguished from
orders not to refrain from doing or not-doing, material illustrative of the
"flexibility" of injunctional orders issued and outstanding and the possibili-
ties of their ramifications are fully presented under "Relief in Equitable Pro-
ceedings Against Torts" in Chapter IV. Rules touching awards of dam-
ages in addition to or in substitution for specific relief are also covered in
this chapter-these problems being carried over into the Code states where
the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity "are abolished,"
but where questions of choice of actions and jury trial still come to the top.
Cases putting meaning into such formula as "balancing convenience,"
"discretion," "laches" and "clean hands" are brought in under "Defenses to
Specific Relief Although Other Remedies Are Inadequate" in the fourth
chapter. An editorial note on the "Effect of Legislative Changes in the Law
of Torts" paves the way for Truax v. Corrigan and the problems signallized
by that case.
In the final chapters consideration is had of the power of the official of
the political state to invoke equitable relief for "Protection of Public and
Social Interests," Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. and In re Debs having
received text space. A survey of some problems of contempt and imprison-
ment therefor constitutes the problems of the last chapter---"The Enforce-
ment of Specific Relief."
The author is substantially indebted to Ames, as he acknowledges, for
text materials and materials used in annotating the text cases. The
author's original citations are extensive, however, and include a full citation,
of articles and notes from law school publications.
WESLEY A. STURGES
Yale University, School of Law.
Our Federal Republic. By Harry Pratt Judson. New York, The Mac-
Millan Co., 1925. pp. xii, 277.
This is an interesting and timely book. It represents the frank but
deliberately-formed views of the president emeritus of the University of
Chicago upon some of the most fundamental problems in our national
political life. It strongly argues that we have gone too far in giving to
the federal government centralized control over matters that were formerly
reserved to the states, that, in the interests of liberty, toleration, and a
proper development of local responsibility, this tendency should be checked,
and, if possible, reversed. One of the last paragraphs in the book reads:
"There should be a Twentieth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. It
should simply repeal all amendments following the Fourteenth." (p. 267).
Nor are the views thus expressed merely the grumblings of a fearful or
discontented conservative, as our younger school of radicals delights to
picture them. President Judson's thesis is fairly presented and persua-
sively developed in an adequate setting of historical fact and political ex-
perience; and his conclusions, however debatable, cannot be dismissed to
the satisfaction of any thoughtful mind by the use of a few of the large,
vague adjectives, so common in the vocabulary of the New Republic.
The author first explains the basic idea of our government-which he
happily calls "the federal equilibrium"--that certain powers shall be ex-
ercised by the national government for all, certain others by the state
governments for their localities, and some are forbidden to the governments
of both the nation and the states, being reserved to the people of the United
States until such time (if ever) as, by constitutional amendment, their
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exercise may be permitted to nation or states. The advantages of a federal
government in giving free play to diversities of origin, culture, institutions,
social and religious customs, modes of life, industries, and climate, and the
wide-spread extension of the principle to municipal home rule within a
state, are convincingly set forth; followed by a discussion of the federal bill
of rights and of the function of the Supreme Court in maintaining it.
The next two chapters deal in some detail with the operation of Amend-
ments XV to XIX. The two suffrage amendments are disapproved, at least
so far as concerns their application to voting for state offices, as violating
the federal principle of home rule in matters chiefly of local concern, it
being emphasized that the Fifteenth, particularly, could not have been
adopted at any time subsequent to 1868. It is suggested with a gool deal
of force that the Seventeenth Amendment might better have pieasittcd
the states to choose senators by popular vote, instead of rcqeiria$g it; and
an entire chapter is devoted to a critical appraisal of the Eightcenth
Amendment. Even the Income Tax Amendment is somewhat mildly dis-
approved, as facilitating congressional extravagance.
A chapter is devoted to the discussion and classification of the ninety-
eight proposals for further amendment of the Constitution, introduced
during the first Session of the 6Sth Congress, only one of which-the Child
Labor Amendment-secured the necessary votes to be sent to the states.
Although most of them will never travel far on this road, yet, as the
author remarks: "They are of interest in showing what sort of measurQs
relating to the organic law appeal to certain elements of our people."
Chapters VII and VIII consider in an interesting way certain attacks upon
the federal equilibrium by Civil War pension legislation and the more
recently-sought federal control of state education by conditional subsidies.
The final chapter briefly states the conclusion that further changes should
be sparingly made, and that, in particular, there should be borne in mind
the difference between those which can be readily enforced by private liti-
gation in the courts, like the Thirteenth and section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and those which require extensive administrative action de-
pending for its success upon general local acquiescence, like the Eighteenth.
The permanent value of the book, however, lies, not so much in the
validity of the author's specific judgments regarding the wisdom of the
last five Amendments, as in the good sense of the general considerations
which he suggests should control the decision of what matters are proper
for a federal constitution in a country as large and diversified as the
United States. These seem to the reviewer admirable, although, for in-
stance, he would not agree that they were violated by the Sixteenth Amend-
ment, however badly the Eighteenth might fare by such standards. It is
unfortunate that in recent years there has been in this country so little
effective discussion of the principles of government. In the mad scramble
by all manner of special interests to secure legislation for their ovm ends,
little but propaganda has received a hearing. More books like this one are
needed, re-examining those theories and principles of government that
experience has tested, and re-emphasizing those that have been found
adequate. In this task President Judson's work will play a useful part.
University of Chicago, School of Law.
JA.cs PAIKmf HALL
Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law. A Study in Mledico-Sociological
Jurisprudence. By S. Sheldon Glueck. Boston, Little, Brown & Co.,
1925. pp. xxii, 693.
To begin with, this is by all odds the best book on the subject that has
come to the reviewer's attention in many a day. Mfost books on this
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subject confine themselves to trying to fit medical concepts and legal con-
cepts together, without seeming to appreciate that they belong to different
magnitudes and are therefore incommensurable. This fault is general in
all such books, whether they be written by a doctor or a lawyer. The
present work is a splendid exception. Whereas the book is written by a
lawyer, he is a lawyer who has had excellent opportunities for an insight
into the problem such as the physician gets; and this opportunity has come
into his life early enough so that he has been able to utilize it with great
advantage. The book therefore has, to my mind, the double advantage of
being written by a lawyer who has a humanistic point of view. This
humanistic point of view is not needed in order to get over suggestions in
line with it to the physician. He is accustomed to it; but the lawyer is by
profession and tradition almost without it and he will not be nearly so
apt to pay attention to recommendations coming outside of his profession.
Therefore I think it especially happy that such an excellent book should
have been written by a lawyer, for I feel that for that reason it is much
more likely to arrest the attention of the legal profession.
Just a word as to the tltoroughness with which the subject is covered.
The whole question of criminal procedure and mental disorder is discussed
in great detail, not only in a general way, historically, but in connection
with the most careful analysis of the outstanding historical cases which
have shaped the development of criminal law and procedure, including a
careful discussion of present practices and decisions and a detailed setting
forth of the law in each state. In addition to this there are valuable and
detailed chapters on the "tests", and a discussion of the disposition of
accused persons not tried or defendants who are acquitted because of in-
sanity or irresponsibility. The book should undoubtedly be the starting
point of all discussions on the various questions it treats from this point on,
In general, as might be expected, because the author is a lawyer, his
recommendations are conservative. He believes in proceeding by a slow,
gradual and sure process of evolution and development rather than by
advocating anything radical. He would, therefore, be willing to sacrifice
ideals that are unattainable by any methods that he can devise for prac-
tical results that are attainable by moderate advances in various directions,
particularly in the way of enlarging the concepts that are now in use
rather than endeavoring to revamp the whole territory. Whichever method
of procedure is advocated, the conservative or the radical, is probably a
matter of temperament almost entirely; and there seems to be no way of
telling when to advocate one and when the other-or what the chances of
success for either may be. The reviewer is rather inclined to believe that
we can never solve the question of responsibility, about which so many of
the pages of this book are written. As I have set forth elsewhere, my be-
lief is that the concept of responsibility is based upon the feeling attitude
which develops towards the defendant. In other words, responsibility is
a conclusion based upon a feeling attitude rather than upon an intellectual
one. It is a rationalization of the jury's wishes. If they wish to punish,
they believe the defendant responsible; if they wish not to punish and are
sympathetic, they believe him irresponsible. This is precisely the reverse
of the way in which the concept is usually thought of, and practically rele-
gates it to the category of legal fictions. The fact that it is a fiction may
or may not be significant. The things that we lived by yesterday are
fictions today, and the things we live by' today will be fictions tomorrow.
Perhaps a more important question is whether as a fiction it has or has
not survived its usefulness. At any rate, the whole idea of guilt or in-
nocence, responsibility and punishment, belong to old theological ways of
thinking. Society is not, or I might perhaps better say should not .be,
interested in responsibility but only in social assimilability. The simple
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thing which I have always advocated is to do away with all these inquiries
into responsibility, insanity and the like, and merely remove anti-social
offenders from society and keep them as long as they remain anti-social.
This, however, is a radical procedure and probably has no way of being
brought about directly. That it is being brought about indirectly, however,
would seem to be the case. In the matter of capital punishment, for ex-
ample, juries will not convict and judges will not sentence. So why insist
upon something which can not be enforced and which is rapidly ceasing to
exist so that today to all intents and purposes it is only the helplecs, poor,
defective adolescents who are executed? Another sign that things are
-changing is the Juvenile Court. Here there are growing up, at least in
some jurisdictions, methods of procedure which are diametrically and
radically and in every way opposed to the old legal traditions. It would
zevidently be futile to make a frontal attack upon these traditions, and yet
the Juvenile Court coming in from the flank unnoticed is building up a
structure which, conceivably, ultimately may by a process of benevolent
assimilation destroy all of the old traditions, which would be able to defend
themselves successfully by any other method of attack.
It is time that society quit settling its affairs with the individual delin-
quent on the basis of vengeance; and the author of this book fully ccs
this aspect of the situation and even suggests that the criminal be no
longer designated by that name but be called offender, having due reg-ard
for the value of new names as stimuli to new points of view. He believes,
also, in the doctrine of partial responsibility, which I take it is a conceZion
to the conservative method of procedure-getting what you can rather than
attempting the impossible. Philosophically, of course, I would naturally be
opposed to this idea because of what I think about the concept of respon-
sibility, and very possibly the author may feel the same way and his sug-
gestion be born of a practical regard for things as they are. He feels,
at least, that the expert should not be called upon to answer questions of
responsibility, and is quite alive to the utter absurdity of citing decision
judges made generations ago under social conditions that were absolutely
different from the present-day conditions as guides for our conduct in this
-wentieth century.
The book needs to be read by every serious student of the criminal law
and practice, be he either lawyer or physician; and whether he takes the
more conservative view of attempting to make progress slowly and in a
practical way, or the more radical method of a new evaluation of the whole
situation, will, as I have suggested, probably depend upon his temperament.
Certainly, social-mindedness is growing at a rapid rate; and no one can
foretell what the immediate future will bring. Very possibly the problem
of the radical today will be that of the conservative tomorrow, or at least
the two programs will tend to merge and be less antagonistic.
WILLAm A. WuiTr
Washington, D. C.
The Branwh Banking Question. By Charles Wallace Collins. New Yorl,
The BMacmillan' Co., 1926. pp. 182.
Unquestionably the livest question in American banking during the last
five years has been with respect to the development of domestic branch
banks. The question is particularly acute in the opening months of 1926
inasmuch as Congress is debating the question in the McFadden-Pepper
Bill and the Supreme Court of California is deciding whether the existing
device for restraining the development of branch banks in California is
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legal and warrantable. It is, therefore, most opportune that a book on
the branch bank question appear this spring.
According to the author the book is designed to bring together in readable
form the various aspects of the question in the United States. It is not
a comprehensive discussion of the theory and practice of commercial bank-
ing under the branch bank system as against the unit bank system. In
fact the greatest weakness of the book is the small consideration given to
the arguments for and against branch banking itself; the only real dis-
cussion of this fundamental problem is found in "Chapter I, Introduction,"
sixteen pages, and even here there is an evident effort to reduce the discus-
sion to a bare summary of arguments and to refrain from taking a positive
stand on the question.
The especial virtue of the book is that it assembles the leading facts--
historical, legislative, administrative, and statistical-of branch banking in
the United States, in such manner as will make the reader understand the
problem of the California Banking Department, of the Federal Reserve
Board, and of Congress, in dealing with the branch bank situation now
before them. The author has drawn his information largely from resolu-
tions and reports of the state and national banking associations; the hear-
ings before state legislature and Congressional committees; the investiga-
tions made by the Federal Reserve Board and reported in the Federal Re-
serve Bulletin; the statutes of the States; the administrative provisions of
the state superintendents of banks, of the Comptroller of the Currency, and
of the Federal Reserve Board; and, finally, Congressional debates. No new
information on the question is contributed by the author; he has simply
assembled and cirefully correlated the leading data from the sources
named. This task has been rendered quite simple by the very paucity of
data and the short period-since 1919-that the question has been promi-
nent. Of the 176 pages of text in the book the last 46 pages are given over
to appendices containing the opinions of the Attorneys General, the Regu-
lations of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Regulations of the Federal
Reserve Board, the provisions of the McFadden Bill, with its many changes
during its legislative history. Quotations, often of considerable length,
also appear frequently in the first 130 pages.
To the reviewer the following features of treatment of the subject seem
worthy of special mention:
1) The author is at pains to differentiate between the problem of city-
wide and state-wide branch banking, and seems inclined to agree with ex-
Comptroller of the Currency Dawes that only the latter should be restrained
by law. The futile efforts of the Comptroller and of the Federal Reserve
Board to secure permission from Congress for the national banks to estab-
lish branches in cities where state banks were operating branches in com-
petition, are given, as is also the action of Comptroller Crissinger in
authorizing "additional offices" and of the First National Bank of St. Louis
in founding branches and testing Missouri's right to stop it.
2) The character and extent of branch banking in the several stat:s
are carefully surveyed, the statutes analyzed, and the recent legislation
on the subject given with reasons and effects. One is here impressed with
the wide diversity of law and banking development, but through it all one
notes the tendency to suppress or control branch banking and to foster in-
dependent unit banking, a policy presumably born of our traditional local
independence coming down from frontier days.
3) The rapid rise of city-, county-, and state-wide banking in California,
is shown to have precipitated the question both upon the California Bank-
ing Department and the State Legislature and upon the American Bankers
Association, the Federal Reserve authorities, and the national Congress,
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The question has reached such malignant form as to threaten vith etinc-
tion the national bank system and therefore the Federal Reserve. The
spread of branch banking in California is shown to be held in temporary
abeyance by agreement between the State Superintendent of Banks and
the California League of Independent Bankers, but this agreement is the
subject of a mandamus suit now in lie before the Supreme Court. Friend
and foe of branch banks have been debating the provisions of the -McFadden
bill which is a compromise on the question and is designed to protect the
national banks and the Federal Reserve system against the Etate branch
banks. The author covers the legislative history of this bill in detail, with
the opinions of its leading supporters and opponents.
4) An examination is made of the policy of the Federal Reserve Board
toward branch banks; the policy is shovm to be shifting and unstable; the
problem of defending and extending the Federal Reserve, of equalizing
the plane of competition of national and state banks, and of allowing the
state member banks to enjoy all their charter privileges, zeems almost
beyond solution. Undoubtedly the Board will welcome a positive statement
of national policy as represented in the McFadden Bill, for the execution
of the prescriptions of law is easier than the formulation and execution of
a policy by Board regulations.
RAY B. WEStzMMELD
Yale University.
